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PREFACE
In the summer of 1974, a project on "Analysis of the World Oil Market"
was initiated by the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory in association with the M.I.T.
Sloan School of Management and the Department of Economics. Over the early
months of activity, the project was sustained at a modest level of effort
by Energy Laboratory internal funds. A three-year research project was
proposed to the National Science Foundation, and in March 197 a grant was
awarded (Grant No. SIA75-00739) for the first 18 months of this period.
This paper is a report on progress after the first six months under the
NSF grant, and a discussion of planned directions of work over the months
to come.
As anticipated at the time the grant was requested, the research is
being carried out under the supervision of Professors Henry D. Jacoby
(Principal Investigator), and Robert S. Pindyck, M.A. Adelman, and
Zenon S. Zannetos (Co-principal Investigators). In addition, the project
has benefited from the participation of Professor Martin Weitzman,
Dr. Maureen S. Crandall of the Energy Laboratory Staff, aid Dr. Pau: L. Eckbo,
formerly a graduate student in the Sloan School and now a participant in
the project through a joint agreement with the Center of Applied Research
of the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. The
research on financial implications of the world oil market, which was not
included in the original grant proposal, has been supervised by Professor
Donald R. Lessard of the Sloan School and Dr. Tamir Agmon, a Visiting
Lecturer at M.I.T. from the Graduate School of Business, Tel Aviv University.
The financial work has continued to be supported in part by internal Energy
Laboratory funds.
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Over the first six months of the project, six graduate student assistants
and two undergraduate assistants have participated in the research.
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1. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN
The evaluation of U.S. energy policies is strongly affected by analyses
and judgments about current and expected trade patterns in the world oil
market, and the associated oil price. At present, U.S. domestic energy
prices follow the world price, and thus developments in this market play a
dominant role in the consideration of measures to stimulate domestic supply
or encourage conservation, and in discussion of the difficult areas of oil
and gas price controls, energy taxation, public utility regulation, and anti-
inflation policy. Further, because of its significance for the domestic
economy, important issues are raised about measures to buffer the country
from the vagaries of the market--by means of tariffs and quotas, or through
security measures such as crude oil stockpiles.
The oil price itself also plays a major role in te planning and
implementation of the national energy R,D&D program. The financial and
economic implications of programs of "commercialization" of new technologies--
be they possible schemes of direct subsidy, or various forms of loan
guarantees--are directly influenced by the expected price :or which te
energy can be sold. In the case of a technology that may be conmercially
exploitable within a reasonable time period given some federal assistance
at the outset, the world oil price determines the level of risk that may have
to be borne by private and public sources. For a technology which may not
be commercially feasible in the next decade or two but which may be granted
a long-term subsidy for reasons of broader national policy, the world oil
price is a key determinant of the level of financial corrmiitment which the
federal government must make.
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Given the importance of the international oil market for domestic policy
deliberations, our understanding of the way it functions and our ability to
analyze potential future developments are woefully poor. The purpose of
this research project is to improve the methods of analysis and supporting
data that are available for this important task.
The focus of the effort is on the actions of the oil cartel as it
attempts to manipulate prices and quantities in the market, and on the
forces of supply and demand that influence the ability of the cartel to
sustain any particular price strategy. The "market" in this instance can
be seen as comprised of three elements:
(1) Importers. There is a set of petroleum importing countries,
dominated by the industrialized economies of the U.S.,
Europe, and Japan. The oil import demand of each of
these countries is determined by thei.r total energy
demand, less the domestic supplies available, and
less imports of other fuels.
(2) "Price-Taker" Suppliers. There is a group of petroleum
exporters who appear to act as "price-takers" in
the sense that each takes the world price (which
is being set by others) as given and makes supply
decisions according to his own parochial interest.
They do not adjust production plans out of concern
for the impact they may have on the overall world
price. This group includes various non-OPEC
sources such as the producers of the North Sea,
the USSR, and China, and potentially other
countries such as Mexico. An important objective
is to see to what extent certain members of OPEC,
which have great needs for revenues, may behave
like price-takers and follow "expansionist" oil
production policies. The most important are
Iraq, Indonesia, and Nigeria.
(3) The Cartel Core. There is a small group of Persian Gulf
nations who form the core of the cartel and who are
the "price-makers" in the terrminology used earlier.
This group includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others
in the Gulf; under some definitions it also may
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include Libya, Iran, and Venezuela.l These countries
face a residual demand for world oil, which is the
total demand less that supplied by the fringe of
price-taker exporters.
The result of this set of circumstances is a dynamic interplay among these
conglonierations of importers and supplies wherein prices are set by the
cartel core, and an attempt is made to control oil production so it does
not outstrip the world demand forthcoming at that price. The resulting
price and quantity patterns, and expectations about their evolution in
the future, have a dominant influence on the energy plans and problems
of most nations.
As the result of our first six-months of work on this market, most
aspects of the analytical approach (many of which were proposed at the
outset) have been decided. Sections 2, 3, and 4 of this report summarize
the work to date in the different areas, and outline the planned research
program over the months to come. In Section 5, a more detailed task-by-task
work schedule is presented. To set the stage for discussion of details of
the work, it is well to summarize the major aspects of our research design.
1.1 The Overall Analytical Framework
Given the state of our knowledge of tis market, the building of a
data base, estimation of empirical supply and demand relations, and study
of the internal mechanics of the market clearing process are judged to be
more important that the elegance of the mathematical structure used to tie
It is important to notice the vagueness of our statement about where
certain countries belong in this simple taxonomy of participants in the oil
market. The orientation and behavior of these countries, though poorly
understood, is critically important for the stability of the cartel.
Study of the implications of the various possible coalitions, therefore,
is a key element of our research.
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all these pieces together. Thus heavy emphasis is put on demand studies
(Section 2), analysis of cost and supply functions for key oil exporters
(Section 3), and the study of the determinants of the structure of prices
and buyer-seller flows in the market (Section 4).
In keeping with this emphasis on the underlying forces in the market,
our initial framework for integrating these components into a coherent
market study is based on what we call a "bathtub" approximation to the world
oil market. That is, the market is treated as a single pool where exporters
put oil in and importers draw it out; the details of the transportation
network and of the refinery sector are treated in a drastically simplified
manner. More complex mathematical representations of these subsectors will
be added only as absolutely necessary, for they usually impose severe limits
on the formulation of supply and demand relations and they greatly increase
the sheer computational load while (with a couple of important exceptions to
be noted below) contributing little to the understanding of larger changes
in the market.
1.2 Two-Part Analys i s.
The basic issues under study here can be boiled down to two interrelated
questions: (1) What is the likely path of the overall level of prices which
the cartel is likely to try to establish over time, and (2) What are the
details of import demand, price-taker supply, and resulting net demand for
cartel oil given a pattern of expected oil prices? A forecast of these two
aspects of the market then provides a conceptual and empirical foundation
for studies of the details of the likely market developments such as patterns
of trade, the relative difficulty of cartel discipline, and the likely
stability or instability of the market price.
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Naturally, the answers to these two questions are highly interdependent,
but for analytical purposes it proves very convenient to separate them at
first and handle each with a different model structure. The reason for
decomposing the problem in this manner is the following: The determinants
of importer demand and price-taker supply are varied and complex and involve
not only matters of cost and price but very important effects of the tax
and regulatory policies of different countries. For analysis of the likely
response of the market to one or another price pattern, there is need for a
model structure that can accept rather complex or unwieldly functional
relationships. This requirement leads naturally to a simulation framework
for the overall analysis of market demand and supply outside the cartel. On
the other hand, analysis of the cartel itself, and its pricing decisions,
may require various forms of static or dynamic optimization calculations.
For this part of the analysis what is needed is drastically simplified
supply-demand relations so that many formulations of cartel behavior may
be simply and cheaply tested.
One might like to analyze the overall problem simultaneously, combining
in one calculation the full richness of supply and demand relations over
time and the analytical fornnulations of cartel behavior. However, our
work to date has led us to believe that a worst this is computationally
infeasible, and at best it would be an unwise approach to research on this
issue. Therefore, we have adopted a to-part or "two-model" approach where
we combine our supply and demand studies into a "numerical laboratory"
which can be used to analyze alternative hypotheses about cartel behavior
(this model is elaborated in Section 1.3). The price scenarios or simple
heuristic pricing rules input to this modei will result from separate,
smaller models designed to study the cartel itself (see Section 4.1 belo',)
or from subjective judmernts about what is likely to take piace.
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1.3 Modular Construction of the Simulation Model
A schematic diagram of the planned structure for the simulation framework
is shown in Figure 1. Each of the rectangular boxes in the figure represents
a "module" of the overall calculation. It is our plan to construct this
framework in such a way that the whole apparatus can be put together at the
outset, perhaps with some very primitive functions and logic in some of the
boxes or "modules." But the model is being designed so that better empirical
estimates and more satisfying logic can be inserted as the research progresses,
simply by replacing old modules with new ones.
The heart of this "numerical laboratory" is the two boxes in the middle,
which contain the functions for price-taker supply and import demand. For
each importing country there will be a demand sub-module, prepared as part
of the demand studies discussed in Section 2. Once the overall framework
is constructed, we will insert very simply functions for each country based
on OECD data or other sources, or applying a judgment about price and income
elasticity. Some experience in this area has already been gained through
the first-stage simulation experiment constructed by Eckbo [3]. As the
demand analysis proceeds, the primitive estimates will be replaced, and
the quality of the overall results upgraded.
Likewise, there will be a supply sub-module for each price-taker supply
region, constructed as a result of the studies discussed in Section 3. Once
again, we will begin with very simply functions for these suppliers and upgrade
the module as the empirical work proceeds.
As noted previously, our initial simulation model will be a "bathtub"
approximation, where transport and refinery activities are greatly simplified.
It is not possible to abstract completely from. these components of the market,
however, for they determine the relationships among the prices of crude oil
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in different parts of the world, and between the price of crude oil and the
prices of refined petroleum products and completing forms of energy (e.g.,
coal and natural gas). The two modules to the left-center of the figure
provide the necessary linkages. The expected price pattern, which comes
from outside this model,l will be stated in terms of some "marker" crude,
say Saudi Arabian light. This must be converted into the relevant crude
oil price pattern at each of the supplier regions and importing countries.
At the outset, this will be done with a simple matrix of transport costs
based on the two to three year time-charter rate (see Section 4.2).
By the same token, the crude oil price to each importing country must
be converted into a set of product prices, for the demand equations will
be estimated in terms of the prices of fuel oil, gasoline, kerosene, etc.
At the outset, this will be done with a simple relationship for refinery
margins, taking account of the excise tax policies of the various consuming
governments. More complex calculations can be devised for this module, as
with transport, but a decision to do so will await experience with the
simpler formulation. In addition, the demand equations require forecasts
of the prices of coal, natural gas, and electricity which re influe;::ed by
oil price, but of course are also affected by a number of other factors.
Once more, complex functions can be devised for this price relationship,
but at the outset this module will contain only a very simple calculation,
very likely based on the concept of BTU equilibrium with special corrections
where regulatory and tax considerations intervene.
For simplicity, we speak here as if the price vector is completely
exogenous to the siniulation model. In fact it will be possible to construct
simple pricing rules that make price endogenous so long as tose rules do not
involve complex manipulation of the supply and demand modules.
-9-
The results of a calculation of total price-taker supply and total
import demand are then inputs to analysis of the market-clearing imecnanisr
and study of the likely problems of cartel stability. That is, who among
the cartel members will produce the oil to meet this net demand, and under
what conditions? In the first version of the simulation framework, this
calculation may be little more than a calculation of net demand and allocation
of this demand among cartel suppliers according to some simple rule in order
to show how the market might "clear. " l But as the work proceeds, more
attention will be devoted to this aspect of the market, and perhaps it will
be possible to incorporate more of the analysis into the simulation model itself.
As discussed below, it is the dynamics of this process, taken in the context
of the net demand conditions, that determines the ability of the cartel to
set the price according to the members' own perceived interest.
However simple or complex the calculation of the market-clearing process,
these results then become inputs to several analysis and interpretation
activities as shown at the far right of Figure 1. First, there is the task
of evaluating results tc check their consistency with the original price
scenario used in the estimation of supply and demand, and of iterati-g this
model with the cartel analysis until inconsistencies have been ferreted out.
Second, there are a rumber of financial issues that are raised by any particular
forecast of world oil trade, and the output from the simulation becomes an
input to such studies (see Section 4.3 below). Finally, there is the matter
of interpreting the policy implications of alternative sets of results.2
For example, this approach is used in our first simulation model prepared
by Eckbo [r3.
2Naturally there are political and ilitary iplications of the results,
as there are simiilar influences on the behavior of the key participants in
the market. While these factors are not the dominant theme in this research,
they are taken into account nwhere we have the capacity to do so.
-1 0-
1.4 Market Clearing Processes
The importance of study of market structure, and the processes by which
detailed country prices and quantities are determined, can be illustrated by
a brief review of how this cartel-dominated nlarket works. First, note that
at any given time various crude oils will have different prices even given
a basic cartel or "marker crude" price. The structure of differentials
refers to four components: Freight, sulfur content, specific gravity
(lighter fractions are more valuable), and "all other" covering a miscellany
of which perhaps the most important is suitability for lubricating oil.
However, the "all other" is usually quite small and may perhaps be treated
as a random disturbance.
Variations in the other three differentials are also small relative to
the cartel price, and may safely be neglected in a simple "bathtub model"
where the task is to calculate import demand and overall price-taker supply.
However, in studying the market-clearing (or market stability) problem
faced by a cartel, these differentials and their fluctuation over time are
of first-rate importance. At any given time there is a certain pattern of
market shires which the cartel members will regard as acceptable, and each
of them will have some lower bound below which he will refuse to go. If
this boundary is violated, a country may change from a cooperative member
to a price-taker, or perhaps even a price-cutter as he strives to redress
the balance, for price differentials will affect market shares.
In the long run, gradual shifts in technology (e.g., desulphurizing),
tastes (e.g., small cars cutting the gasoline fraction), or growth rates
(faster industry growth boosting the demand for residual fuel) will change
the amount demanded of a given country's output. If the quantities supplied
by each cartel member are fixed, then price relationships must change. If
-11 -
prices for each type of crude are fixed, then the quantities taken must
change. More likely there will be change in each dimension.
Perhaps more difficult to handle are the changes which take place
within a year. The sulfur premium can change appreciably, while fluctuations
in short-teni tanker rates are notorious, and may reach 100% upward or 50%
downward of the true long-term rate, even in years of no big outside
disturbance like an embargo. The result is that delivered prices fluctuate
considerably, and so does the desirability of one or another type of curde
to a refiner trying to minimize costs. The impact on the refiner's profit
margin may be very large indeed even when the differential is small as a
percentage of the delivered crude price.
The problem is compounded by the excess capacity which is characteristic
of most cartels, and which is very marked at this time in OPEC. A country
whose crude happens to be more desirable can offer very large additional
amounts at short notice. There is also same interaction with a relatively
under-employed tanker fleet, where the supply of tanker services is very
elastic because ships are being operated at low speeds and there is an
overhang ol ships in port available for service.
If the market-clearing process were left to each country's discretion,
then it would probably be impossible to maintain the current price level or
anything resembling it. Nobody twould know what was the right price to charge.
The surplus capacity would shift uncontrollably back and forth. Erosion of
a price level generally begins with distortion of the price structure, and
loss of control of discounts and extras.
The fact that the cartel members are governments makes the situation
easier for them in some cases, harder in others. Loss of sales means loss
of budget revenues. Where the country has large holdings of liquid assets
-1 2-
with which to meet its expenses, particularly foreign exchange expenditures,
it can hold fast to a given price level. Otherwise, the pressure may be
great to increase output no matter what.
But an acceptable realignment of market shares can be accomplished
either by governments reducing the customary differentials, or by the
standard or "marker crude" (Saudi Arabian light) rising to restore the
previous balance. Hence a counter-intuitive result, borne out in October
1975, is that weakness of demand may lead to a higher cartel price. It may
possibly be a non-maximizing price for the "inner core" or even for the
cartel taken as a whole, but it may be a necessary side payment from the
core to the fringe to keep them from acting as real price-takers. This
kind of solution is characteristic, since a cartel is a diverse organization
which must resort to second best or n-th best solutions.
The market-clearing process is still largely the responsibility or
task of the international oil companies. Under the old concession system
the profit margins on crude production were sufficiently large to dampen
or sometimes prevent altogether any movement from higher-cost to lower-cost
crude. A company with one or two large oncessions was tied to one or two
crudes, and would only have sacrificed profits by switching its crude
procurement in response to market prices. The relevant variable was the
price of the purchased crude vs. the much lower tax-paid cost of its "own
crude." A company with two or more concessions would make a comparison of
respective tax-paid costs rather than of market prices. The ultimate decision
was left to bargaining with the respective governments, backed up by pressures
and veiled threats.
To a large extent this system is still effective, but the degree of
effectiveness is one of the chief unknowns we need to investigate. The
corporations and the governments are now bargaining over the renumeration of
13-
the resident companies. The bargaining is of course over investment requirements
and sources of investment funds, operating costs, management or service fees,
etc.; there may also need to be something akin to a "marketing fee" (or some
other set of words to describe a price concession) to equalize the attractiveness
of the crude to the refining company. The international companies are moving
away from producing their "own crude," and de-emphasizing crude production
at high profits which will cover possible losses in disposal.
Thus the cartel members must either change premiums and discounts at
short notice, or change the allowances given to resident companies to -make
the crude more attractive to them, or tolerate wide swings in output and
market share for any given country. All of these expedients are practical
and have been observed in practice, but all are obviously less desirable
than the solution for which they are now groping: to fix a scale of
differentials which will hold for an appreciable period of time, so that each
cartel member may at all times know what every other cartel member is charging.
It is well known that the OPEC meetings have paid much attention to this
topic and that serious attempts are being made to design and implement
such a scheme.
For our research, these considerations indicate the following: First,
the overall two-part simulation framework is an essential input to the study
of this process, for the level of net demand on cartel sources, and the
resulting excess capacity amont cartel members, are the do.-.:nant factors in
any consideration of the details of market behavior. Second, the analysis
must include estimates of the market value of each of these differentials--
both for purposes of calculating long-run prices in the simulation framework
(as shown in Figure ) and for studying the effects of likely shorter-terl,
disturbances. The work on transportation and refining cost elements is set
-14-
forth in Section 4.2. For the refining process, our initial approach will
be to set forth a set of imaginary large refineries in the principal importing
and exporting centers, and to match-up product price differentials on the one
side with the chief elements of the appropriate crudes on the other.
Third, there is need for a continuing process of monitoring and
evaluating developments in the market such as
(1) The company commitments to operations in any given
country, and the payment for the services it
renders, as well as the discretion of the
government in changing that payment.
(2) The practics of the companies in procuring crude oils.
(3) The amounts of integrated crude and open market crude
in each principal exporting area, and the direct
sales made by each important cartel government,
and to which non-resident company.
(4) The progress of the cartel in setting differentials.
For the cartel, these various efforts and policies represent an attempt to
avoid the divisive and perhaps impossible task of formal market sharing and
output limitation of a more conventional type. The more successful is the
control of price differentials, the less attention need be paid to prorationing.
It is through the analysis of these detailed aspects of the market's
functioning--backed up by empirical studies and simulation analysis of the
gross movements in the market--that we hope to contribute to better forecasts
of likely future developments in world oil, and to improved evaluations of
U.S. policy choices that depend on the price of international petroleum.
-15-
2. DEMAND ANALYSIS
In designing the demand analysis, a division has been made between the
15 countries which are the largest consumers of oil, and the rest of the non-
Coninunist world. For the large consumers it was decided that many of the
iiiost important questions concerning the demand for oil could be answered
only in a framework that allowed for separate studies of energy demand by
different economic sectors. So, as shown in Figure 1, where conditions
warrant and data permit, the demand sub-module for a particular country
will be disaggregated into consumption, industrial, transportation, commercial,
and energy transformation demands. (The energy transformation sector
includes power plants, refineries, coal mines, etc.)
The residential and industrial sectors will be modeled in considerable
detail, at least for the largest oil using countries. The transportation,
comnercial, and energy sectors will be modeled at a less detailed level at
the outset, and therefore the data requirements are less stringent. The
exception will be certain countries where the oil vs. nuclear choice in
electric generation is of particular importance; to the extent that data
and project resources permit, special analysis may be devoted to fuel
choice in electric power generation, as shown by the dotted box in Figure 2.
The Commnunist countries and others which are not substantial importers
of oil will be joined into a few regional groupings, and the demand in these
regions will be analyzed on the basis of national or regional aggregates with
no sectoral breakdown.
2.1 Data Development
Our initial data collection goal was to gather the necessary data for the
15 largest oil consuming countries for the years 1955-74. The search to
-16-
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determine what was "out there" began in March, 1975, and the actual collection
began in June. We quickly became aware that we were breaking new ground, so
to speak, in that much of the information we needed had not been gathered by
the agencies to which one traditionally turns for energy data--i.e., the U.N.,
OECD, or other oil modeling groups.
The available data were particularly weak in the residential sector.
For example, we need the retail prices of petroleum products that consumers
faced in each of these countries, as well as the retail prices of the direct
substitutes for petroleum products--coal, natural and manufactured gas, and
electricity. Quantities of each of these energy sources consumed by the
residential sector are also necessary. We found that the data available
from the U.N. and OECD for these areas were very limited. For example,
the OECD lumps agriculture, handicrafts, and residential consumption together.
To fill this data gap we have turned to various national publications, such
as annual statistical yearbooks. From such publications we have been able
to obtain nearly all the necessary data for the residential sector. However,
in some countries the data simply were never collected. In those instances
it often is possible to estimate the missing information. For example,
for some countries the quantitites of petroleum products consumed by households
were unavailable, but estimates of the amount of money spent by households on
petroleum products were available from government yearbooks. Given an average
price for petroleum products, an estimate of the quantities consumed can be made.
Traditional sources have proved to be more useful for the industrial
sector. For example, the OECD has collected the quantities of fuel consumed
by industry for ts member countries. For many of its member countries the
U.N. has data on ependitures by the industrial sector for energy, capital,
raw materials, and labor. We have obtained computer tapes of these data from
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each of these agencies. Again, however, it has proved necessary to go to
individual national sources for many of the data on fuel prices for industry,
as well as for input prices for energy, capital, raw materials, and labor.
As with the residential sector, we found that many of the needed data are
simply unavailable for some countries. In some cases it will be possible to
estimate the data; in others the model that we use will have to be adjusted
to take account of the missing data.
With the data gathering effort for the largest oil consuming countries
drawing to a close, it appears that we will be able to use our sectoral
approach for 12 of the 15 largest consumers. These 12 will include at
least the 6 largest oil consumers. Data unavailability precludes modeling
all 15 in this disaggregated fashion.
2.2 Plans for Estimatior.
2.2.1 Residential Demnand
As anticipated in our proposal, residential demand will be modelled using
a two-stage procedure, where we first break down the consumption basket for
each country into a set of commodity classes, one of which would be energy.
This analysis will be very interesting in itself, and will enable us to
examine the residential demand for energy and the way that demand fits into
the consumption basket in different countries. The second stage is to break
energy demand down into demands for alternative fuels (oil, gas, coal,
electricity). The advantage of this approach is that it will enable us
to analyze the impact of a price change (or change in any other exogenous
variable) on the demand for oil in terms of the effect on total energy usage
and t. effect on fuel choice. This is important with respect to the design
of po :es for energy conservation.
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The expenditure breakdown study will be done using alternative model
specifications, both consistent (in tenns of additivity) and inconsistent.
We will begin work this month in repeating Houthakker's 1965 study [4] using
more recent data and our own commodity breakdown. In attempting to confirm
his results, we will have the opportunity to explore some basic issues in
the pooling of heterogenous data. Next, we will estimate a set of static
consumption breakdowns that are consistent: the linear expenditure system,
perhaps an additive quadratic model, and certainly a translog system (extending
Jorgenson's work [5] to international data). The idea is to push these
systems to andle the kind of pooled data that we will be working with. In
all cases "within country" and "between country" regressions will be performed
to isolate short-term and long-term effects wherever possible. Our objective
here will be to answer a variety of questions, including the following:
1. Is it meaningful to pool the data from countries that are
structurally quite different? Perhaps it is better to run
separate time-series regressions for each country (albeit
with only a limited amount of data) than to pool the data
and introduce a possible specification error. On the
other hand, structural differences across countries
might be taken care of through the use of regional dummy
variables or regiona: structural variables.
2. What are the differences between short-run and long-run
elasticities (not worrying, for now, about the dynamics
of going from the short-run to the long-run)? Are those
differences--as estimated for different consumption categories--
consistent w:ith the simple theory? Can these differences
lead us to an a priori specification of the dynamic structure?
3. Are there some fundamental data problems, including inconsistencies
across countries? Hopefully we will learn a good deal about our
data rcom these initial static estimations. Is there much gain
in efficiency from the use of more sophisticated estimation
methods? The static models would give us an opportunity to
experiment with econometric methods in a "controlled" setting
where results are relatively easy to interpre t and understand.
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Our next step will be to specify and estimate dynamic versions of one
or more of the static models mentioned above. Dynamic adaptations of the
linear expenditure system are straightforward, but designing a dynamic
version of the translog function will be more difficult. As noted in
Section 1, a basic approach throughout this research is to start with
simple formulations and replace them with improved versions as the work
proceeds and as time and computer resources permit.
As a result of these estimations, a model (or set of models) will be
available to explain total energy demand in the residential sector for many
of the major energy consuming countries. Energy demand can then be broken
down by fuel type using a second "consistency" model. Logit and translog
specifications are obvious choices, and both will be pursued. We will begin
with static specifications for these fuel choice models that will allow us
to explore the same problems of pooling, long-run versus short-run effects,
etc. We will then specify and estimate dynamic versions.
It is important to reiterate that this "sophisticated" approach to demand
modeling will be used only for a subset of oil importing countries, since
for some Lountries the detailed data necessary simply are not available;
for other countries the data are available, but the countries are small,
and the effort and expense of collecting and analyzing the data is not worth
the return. Thus, the demand for oil in some countries will be modeled using
simple constant elasticity equations, with dynamic adjustments built in. 
It is expected that this simpler approach will have to be applied to countries
that constitute less than 30% of total non-Communist oil demand.
In the early stages of the estimation, this approach will have to be
followed even for some of the large consumers in order to allow preparation
of the overall simulation to proceed even though the demand studies are only
partially complete.
2.2.2 Industrial Demand
Industrial demand lso will be modeled using a two-stage approach.
The first stage will consist of a model determining the total demand for
energy as a derived factor input in the industrial sector. Our first
approach will be to use a translog production function that includes
capital, labor, and energy as factor inputs. (It would also be desirable
to include materials as an input, but the requisite data are not available.)
While we will begin our estimation in this area with a static specification,
we will concurrently explore ways of specifying a dynamic version of the
translog system.
The second stage of the model would also break total energy demand
down into particular fuel choices. Again we plan to test both a logit and
a translog specification, static at first, and then dynamic.
2.2.3 Transportation Demand
Transportation demand includes gaoline,
used in transport services. This is an area
may take place in response to higher prices,
approach here will be to use simple elastici
the demand for each fuel to prices, incomes,
constant elasticity specification.
diesel fuel, jet fuel, etc.
where a considerable change
particularly i the U.S. Our
ty demand equations that relate
etc., in a simple dynam,ic
2.2.4 Commercial and Other Demands.
This sector includes stores, office buildings, and other commercial
establishments arCn o irt. schools nd other public buildings. in order
apply the tmore detailed analysis that is being used for the residential
industrial sectors, an additional data reparation effort would be requi
to
and
ured,
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particularly for price information. It appears feasible to obtain these
data, ut the task is beyond the current resources of the project. Therefore,
we intend to use those simple formulations that are allowed by the data
easily available.
Naturally, in a subsequent phase of this research, when the more
important residential and industrial sectors have been satisfactorily
analyzed, we will turn over resources to improving the estimation of
these conmmercial and government activities.
2.2.5 Energy Transformation
The demand for energy by the energy producing sector includes the
use of energy (coal, oil, gas, and nuclear) to produce electricity. It
would also include the consumption of energy for coal mining, and the
consumption f energy in the process of oil refining and natural gas
transmission.
Our initial approach to estimation of energy demand by this sector will
be to fit standard econometric relations. There is one instance, however,
where there is a need for mo.-e detailecd analysis. This is the fuel choice
in electric power production, given the electricity demands estimated
separately for the residential, industrial, and commercial sectors.
Because nuclear power is not reflected in the historical data, and because
the demand for nuclear and coal-fired power, as opposed to oil-fired power,
is being significantly influenced by national policies to achieve "independence"
of the world oil market, the econometric analysis needs to be supplemented
by a special analysis of the process of fuel choice in this sector. As
shown by the dotted box in Figure 2, we hlope to develop such and analysis,
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but it is not year clear what can be done in this area over the next year
of the project given available project resources, and the allocation of
those resources over the many tasks at hand. If it does not prove possible
to do justice to this problem in the current phase of tile work, this will be
a high-priority item in a subsequent stage of research on this market.
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3. SUPPLY STUDIES
In our investigation of supply conditions in the world market, the
econometric technique used so extensively in the demand analysis will have
to be largely supplanted by geological data, detailed engineering cost
estimation, and simulation of government and industry development decisions.
There are several reasons why the physical and cost data are so important.
To date, most econometric investigations have traced out the effect of
price changes, both down and up, on the supply from large productive systems,
such as crude oil or natural gas in the United States. Hundreds of fields,
each containing a number of reservoirs, have given these systems the stability
of large numbers; and the depletion effect, tending to raise costs as less
of a reservoir remains, has in large measure been offset by new discoveries
and improvements in technology. In studying supply from other areas of the
world, the conditions for analysis are less favorable. In many countries
the oil fields are both fewer and younger, and even the short histories are
poorly documented.
Another factor limiting tie use of econometrics in supply studies is
that the price series of the past are fragmentary and untrustworthy. The
so-called "posted prices" become meaningless around 1960, when they became
artifacts used for the calculation of taxes. Data on arms-length sales of
crude are insufficient and ridden with too many errors to serve as a basis
for econometric investigations. Moreover, the imperfect competition existing
even before the dominance by the cartel means that the production response
in some areas was governed not only by relative costs and price but by
considerations of political stability, desire for diversification to avoid
political risk, etc. For these reasons, and orderly summation of the past is of
limited help in deciding on future relations between prices and outputs.
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3.1 Sujpiy odel Design For Price Takers
In this circumstance, the approach we have adopted to the analysis of
price-tkcer suppliers is to develop a simulation of the process of exploration,
discovery, and production in various oil producing regions of the world. This
is an ambitious undertaking, and we cannot expect to be able to perform this
analysis on any but a limited number of the larger basins; the supply from
other areas will have to be approximated by far simpler relationships, by
judgmental forecasts, or by borrowing from other analyses (as we very likely
will do for the continental United States, for example).
The process which needs to be analyzed is summarized in Figure 3.
Beginning at the left side of the diagram, exploratory drilling produces a
flow of new discoveries in a basin. Depending on costs and the expected oil
price, some of these discoveries will be economic to produce; others will be
too small to justify the initial cost of development. The resulting collection
of pools that are of economic size can be thought of as an inventory of
prospects for development--a quantity that may be referred to as "available
recoverable reserves." In older areas, this inventory will include some
fields that are already being produced, and others which are undergoing
development for production in the future. The decisions of firms and
governments to develop productive capacity in discovered fields, and the
associated rates of depletion of those fields once developed, combine to
determine the pattern of supply from each producing area.
The outcome of this process of discovery, development, and production
is influenced by a host of factors. Resource constraints (most importantly,
the available reserves) are a critical factor; at each stage in the process
the costs o development and production are important, along ,,ith the
expected price at which the oil can be sola. And of course all choices are
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influenced by the tax policies of the governments concerned. Ultimately, it
is our intention to develop a model to simulate this entire process, so that
forecasts of likely petroleum supply can be made over periods of time as
long as 15 or 20 years. At the outset, however, we will work toward a less
ambitious goal, and will construct a supply analysis which can support
reasonable forecasts over a five to ten year period. Analysis of the longer
run will build on this initial effort.
We will begin our work at the right-hand side of Figure 3 and focus our
efforts on constructing a module which can analyze and forecast the supply
of petroleum out of known basins over the period when nearly all production
will come from reserves that are already fairly well-quantified. These areas
fall into three categories:
(1) fields that are already partially or completely developed
(2) fields here development drilling is already underway
or planned, and
(3) areas where pools of economic size are known to exist,
but development drilling programs have not yet
been initiated or planned.
In the first two cases, the estimates of capacity can be based on relatively
good data (many of which are in the public domain), and an analysis of the
likely rate of depletion can be carried out--taking account of operating costs,
current and expected prices, and the relevant regulations and taxes. In the
case of the third category of available reserves, it will be necessary to
simulate the decisions regarding development drilling and the bringing of
new fields into production.
The analysis of rates of depletion of already-developed fields will b2
the most accurate portion of any forecast of oil supply. The probiem is one
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of collecting the available data and putting them into a calculation format
that will allow proper aggregation and analysis. On the basis of this rather
simple analysis, forecasts of up to three years can be made for on-shore
fields; for offshore developments these data will give a reasonable forecast
for as long as five years because of the very much longer lead times in
these areas.
Analysis of the steps followed to bring previously undeveloped reserves
into production can extend the forecast horizon up to five years or so onshore,
and to as long as seven or eight years offshore. This is possible because
new reservoirs which are discovered as a result of exploratory drilling in
any year are not likely to enter into production for up to five years onshore
or seven or eight years offshore given the normal lead times in the
development process.
It is our feeling that, though it be limited in the time horizon it can
consider, the analysis conducted at this "downstream" end of the exploration
and development process will of itself make a valuable contribution to our
understanding of world oil supply. There are several factors that determine
oil supply, and in many studies a great deal of attention s given tc
available reserves, or potentially discoverable reserves as a key determinant.
In the long term this may be true, but over the horizon of five to ten years
the reserve base, though significant, does not appear to be the dominant
factor in oil supply. The key determinants are:
(1) The tinle delays in development investent,
particularly in high-cost offshore and
inaccessible onshore areas,
(2) The tax rules and exploitation policies of
the government's concerned,
(3) The costs of rigs, platforms, and other input
factors, and
(4) The current and expected world price of crude oil.
To the extent this is a proper evaluation of the relative importance of
these factors, a model which does no more than simulate investment patterns
and production profiles from known resources, taking account of available
data on programs and plans, can give a reasonable approximation of the
expected supply function over this short to medium-term period.l
Beyond the five to ten year period covered by this framework based on
known reserves, a more complex apparatus is required. The analysis must be
extended "upstream" to include the process by which new reserves are added
to the available inventory. The determinants of this supply function of
reserves include: (1) the expected characteristics of the reservoirs to be
discovered, (2) the expected cost of exploring and for developing these
reservoirs, (3) the expected fiscal and non-fiscal regimes by which
exploratory and production activities are to be regulated, as well as (4)
the expected price of oil over the lifetime of production from the reservoirs
to Le discovered. These four factors determine the economic incentive that
corporations will have to look for and produce from oil reservoirs. Very
likely each factor will be represented by a separate component in the advanced
version of the supply model. By sirm':ating the interaction between these
four components, the process by which reservoirs of oil are explored for,
found, and transformed into actual supply per period of time from a given
geopolitical area can be represented.
In this work, we can take advantage of previous work at M.I.T. in this
area [7].
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There are, however, a number of problems associated ,;i..': ,e precise
design of each component, as well as the interaction betw[L t;' . The
distribution of various geological parameters is of great ;;:'.if'cance.
Extensive study of the size-frequency distribution of oil e:','s has been
done by Kaufman [6] and others. We will lean heavily on ' o;-.s w rk. Aggregating
from the size-frequency distribution of pools in a play to 2'.: size-frequency
distribution of pools in a geopolitical area does, however, -:ie serious
conceptual and empirical problems. Government regulation o Ai. exploratory
process introduces irregularities that make it more difficult -:o predict the
most likely sequence of discoveries to be made from a given :.i.oratory
effort. Moreover, the cost of looking for, developing, and ro-ducing from,
an individual pool is dependent not only on the geological ch-aracteristics
of the pool and the relevant government regulations but on the total market
for the input factors that are required. The market or some input factors
(like rigs) extends beyond the geopolitical area represented to which the
module in Figure 3 will be applied, which implies that the problems inherent
in a general as opposed to a partial equilibrium analysis will have to be
faced.
The future price of oil will be represented in this module by an exogenous
price vector as noted in Section 1, where the countries analyzed are those
assumed to behave as price takers. The fiscal and non-fiscal regulations to
which developers are subject will in general be designed according to the
declared political objectives of the relevant government--taking account of
existing rules and the relative economic attractiveness of the area. Of
course, tax systems are of differing complexity, concession agreements leave
room for different interpretations, and other regulations (like production
ceilings) may or may not be executed as they are formulated today. The
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uncertainty associated with these factors makes it difficult to formulate
hypotheses about how expectations are formed in this sector. Such rules
will be constructed, however, and by incorporating these components into
the simulation framework we will have the flexibility to test alternative
formulations of these different influences.
At the outset, under the general approach taken throughout this study,
the overall supply module in Figure 1 will necessarily have to be based on
some very simple functions for many areas of the world. The actual basin
supply module represented in Figure 3 will be constructed using the North
Sea as a case example. A second trial area, in order to assure the general
applicability of the model design, will be an appropriate onshore region.
The total number of basins treated in this manner will depend on the
availability of data, our success with the first experiments, and the
availability of project resources. At this point it appears that the
"downstream" end of the supply module can be constructed for many of the
important production areas of the world, based on data that are in the
public donlain. Naturally, as the analysis proceeds to consider exploratory
drilling and its determinants, the data and analysis problems will multiply,
and the number of areas subjected to detailed analysis may have to be restricted
so far as work in the next 10 to 12 months of the project is concerned.
3.2 Data Development and SuDportinq Analysis
The supply module of Figure 3 will be constructed only for supplier
countries that are thought to behave as price takers. This approach is not
appropriate for members of the core of the cartel: these countries are
engaged in setting the price, not fol lowing it, and therefore he roduction
decisions are the result of a holly different calculus, as discussed elow
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in Section 4. It is nonetheless important to have information on the reserves
and capacity figures in the cartel countries, for these data are important in
forming judgments about likely behavior of various members of the cartel.
Therefore many of the data that are relevant for construction of the supply
module shown in Figure 3 are also desired for the less formal analysis of
the circumstances faced within the cartel countries.
The empirical work to support the supply analysis falls into three
areas. First is the gathering of data on resource constraints as they are
understood today. Ultimate oil and gas resource estimates seem (perhaps
for the first time) to have soine economic meaning in the sense that
overall oil and gas output may reach its peak some time within the next
20 to 30 years, which is at the outer reaches of the analysis being conducted
in this project. And, as noted earlier, the amount of available recoverable
reserves are estimated with fair accuracy for most countries, but precision
decreases rapidly as one examines separate fields and basins. The collection
of those data on these various categories of reserves that are in the public
domain is being carried out and will continue in the future.
The second area of concern is the current production capacity in each
of the major supply areas and the likely evolution of this capacity in the
future, given the resource-reserve limits on expansion. These estimates,
which are an input to the "downstream" end of the supply module discussed
earlier, involve a tabulation and appraisal of current capacity figures and
expansion plans announced by companies and governments. It also requires
study of the limits on current operating rates: a reserve may be depleted
so quickly that the water or gas which serves as the force driving it
toward the well breaks through, leaving the oil behind. This need to
avoid the risk of losing part of the reserves sets a different kind of
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limit on the likely rate of development and exploitation of any given field.
The work to date on capacity is sunnarized below.
A third area of importance to the construction of the supply module
and to the understanding of the internal functioning of the cartel is the
cost of development under current depletion conditions in key supply areas.
Given an oil and gas reservoirs, with known costs and expected prices, there
is some rate of depletion which is the most desirable from the standpoint
of the company or government managing the exploitation. For example, if
one examines development plans in new large reservoirs, tne peak rate of
depletion is nearly always in the range of 6 to 11 percent of reserves. At
higher discount rates, this rate might be speeded up, though once again
there may be constraints which make this a very expensive thing to do.
Analysis of this question requires data on the capital costs of development
in different areas and the various operating costs that are associated with
alternative rates of exploitation. The work to date in this area also is
described below.
Up to this point nearly all of the effort in data collection and
evaluation on the supply side has been directed to countries which are
currently members of OPEC, particularly the Persian Gulf nations, or to
countries operating in the North Sea. With the recent decision to take
the North Sea as our case exarpHe in constructing the first stage of a
supply module for the simulation analysis, there will be a shift of emphasis
to that aa, although ork on the middle eastern countries will continue.
Small amounts of work have been done on the Co,!unrist block, primarily
Russia and China, and we expect in future months to expand our investigation
to include mo3re wrk on th e 'o :oun'tries as well as Mexico, whic is
currently considered to nave a potential for significant expor.s.
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3.2.1 Capacity Estimates
Thus far we have made capacity estimates for OPEC members based on
estimated total oil well completions for any one year and forecast total
completions for the following year. These capacity estimates are dated
end-year from 1973 through 1975. For most countries, capacity it is estimated
as the sum of the highest level of production attained in that country plus
the estimated number of oil well completions times average output per well.
For certain countries, such as Saudi Arabia, a local or constrained peak
was chosen. We estimate Saudi capacity based on the oil well completions
after July, 1973, although it is widely known that daily output has since
exceeded that level. The selection of the constrained peak of 1973 for
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, and Algeria was determined by the political
developments in that year.
Capacity estirm.-es may be defined either gross or net. Gross capacity
reflects peak production plus estimated capabilities of new wells added.
Net capacity reduces gross capacity by the estimated amount of decline in
production during the period covered. The change in net capacity can be
approximated for any country s
AC AC - (2q . 365) (q) (3-1)
net gross R
where q is daily output and R is the most recently dated reserves estimate.
IThe factor of 2 in the equation is intended to account for differences
in the definition of reserves as often reported abroad and the more narrow
concept of proved reserves as applied by the A.P.I., which is relevant to
the calculation of decline rates.
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We have made no judgments as to what fraction of estimated net capacity
represents usable capacity. (Others have suggested that for at least one
country--Saudi Arabia--installed capacity is generally about 10% more than
usable capacity.) Moreover, our net capacity is not precisely identical to
the concept of installed capacity, for our method is based on the build-up
in well completions, and ignores the necessary complementarity of other field
facilities such as gas-oil separator plants, main oil lines, etc. Nonetheless,
we feel our capacity estimates for the future are at least as good as others
offered, and ours for the past appear in general to be well validated.1
Combination of our capacity estimiates and monthly production figures
reported in the trade press give us current excess capacity in OPEC countries.
This we maintain on a monthly basis. An example of the most recent
calculation is shown in Table 1.
3.2.2 Costs
Capital costs er initial daily barrel of production. To date our
investigations have been concentrated in the countries of the Middle East.
Our work n Iran and Saudi Arabia can serve as an example of this effort.
In the case of Iran we have examined the Capital Look-Ahead plans for the
formen r Iranian Consortium from 1964 through 1973 (onshore fields only,
with the exception of Kharg Island). These annual capital forecasts are
generally for a period of five years, ending unfortunately with the plan
dated September, 1973. These documents give a fairly sound idea of what
1It should be stressed that any estimate of net capacity or excess
capacity depends on an in;portant eegree upon the size o the reserves figur-
used or te pIurose o, auinnq ne ecIne re. Even a respected source,
the itrr,ationa etro le; Enryco-,c ia, containrs inconrsistencies (which
have been removec oilc ioir ig corresponoence) be' w een to G, its own tables,
and ;.'ittl c er sources.
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has been the historical pattern of the capital cost per developed barrel,
as well as the anticipated cost, in a land area remarkable for its difficult
drilling conditions.
Generally speaking, capital costs of development should include all
costs of developing production from the wellhead to the point of export.
For the former Iranian Consortium, and presumably for other operators
elsewhere in the world, there are three major definitions of capital costs
of development: (1) costs of field facilities, meaning production units,
boosters and pumpsets, main-oil-lines and loops; (2) costs of (1) plus
flowline and well costs; and (3) costs of both (1) and (2) plus (Kharg)
terminal costs. Frorl Iranian data we are attempting to extrapolate
capital costs per initial daily barrel for land areas elsewhere in the
Middle East. The 1973 Iranian forecast of capital costs, made before the
full impact of the current inflation was known, placed per barrel development
costs for 1974 and 1975 at $220 and $132 respectively (in 1973 prices).
On the other hand, we find evidence of steeply rising marginal costs in
Iranian onshore fields, for any expansion much beyond the current estimated
capacity of about 6.5 to 6.6 million barrels per day.
It should be noted that the cost of output and capacity in Iran, or in
any other producing area, is not only determined by the costs of net new
increments installed, but by the costs of continuous maintenance of existing
well capacity. We had long thought the decline rates to be below 5 per
year in the Middle East, yet Iranian documents suggest that output rom
For those two years, the capital costs per barrel include anticipated
expenditures for wellhead separators and pumps, produc tion units,and pumps,
boosters and conmpressors, ant m.ain oil lines, nWhile fluid injection plans
to maintain pressure were carried as addenda items, such amounts are not
included in the above coefficients.
existing wells was expected to decline by more than 50 percent during the
1974 through 1978 period in the absence of maintenance, fluid injection, and
the drilling of new facilities. Annual decline rates were estimated at 17.8
percent if no remedial work occurred; these were reduced to 9.4 percent if
stimulation, workovers, and desalination programs were carried out; they were
further reduced to just under 8 percent if wellhead separators, loops, and
boosters were installed in addition to the stimulation and other programs.
Turning to Saudi Arabia, we can see some of the difficulties presented
by incomplete or conflicting data sources. One would expect to find capital
costs for development of onshore prospects less costly than in Iran, for the
drilling conditions are less formidable in Saudi fields. Unfortunately, we
have not been permitted access to Aramco documents similar to those of the
former Iranian Consortium; thus all conclusions are based on publicly
available data presented before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, and calculations made therefrom.
These data have been extremely difficult to use, for we have no precise idea
of the timing of capital programs as those are turned into streams of
expenditu'e s, nor do we know the length of time between the initiation of
an expenditure program for expansion and the resultant increase in effective
capacity. Several attempts to interpret the Senate Committee presentations
to date suggest that on average capital coefficients in Saudi Arabia range
from $100 to $260 per barrel in 1973 dollars. These figures are not at all
in agreement with the press reports of $200 onshore and $400 offshore in "the
Middle East," nor are they in agreement with the "unit cost" (i.e., unit
investment) figures reported by Aramco for the onshore fields of Shaybah
($1300 in 1975 prices), Haradh ($510 in 1973 prices), and Khurais-Mazalij
($810 in 1973 prices).
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If we subtract estimated operating costs of $214.4 million from Aramco's
total 1973 expenditures of $374.8 million, then Aramco's capital expenditures
in that year are estimated at $160.4 million.l (The rig-time method of
estimating capital expenditures gives $166.6 million for Aramco in 1973,
which confirms the magnitude of the first estimate.) From Aramco's Annual
Report, we know the company installed over 3 million barrels per day of
capacity in 1973, for a capital coefficient per initial daily barrel of
approximately $55. Even if we were to assume that all of the $374.8
million was capital expenditure, the capital coefficient would still be
no more than $125 per barrel, well below the other estimates cited above.
But it may not be correct to associate capital expenditures in any one
year with new capacity going onstream in that same year. Large capital
expenditures might be made in a year in which very little new capacity
was fully introduced, thus generating a very high capital coefficient. Or,
as in the 1973 case, the coefficient may be remarkably low, perhaps because
the whole 3 million barrel per day capacity increment was waiting on only
the last in a series of expenditures on complementary facilities. What we
do not knc.', and need to pursue, are the time lags involved as well as the
discrete nature of the expansion process.
The results of a thorough perusal of the literature dealing with
announced capacity expansion programs permit us to array the prospects
from lowest to highest cost. These prospects are by field, both offshore
and onshore, in Iraq, Egypt, Neutral Zone, Iran, Indonesia, Abu Dhabi,
Gabon, People's Republic of the Congo, and india.2 The iraqi North Rumaila
Total expendi tures are calculated by mnul t pl ino 1973 output by
Petroleum n I Ir.-,ei ce .:e_.Liv 's ou1t;ay per arreI Of S0 .14; operating costs
are figured a $0.03 per arrel
2Saudi Arabia is included, b +t costs are Aramco's unit costs" rather
than estintd capital coeff icien-s v deveio.-.en.
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field is lowest at about $200 (1973 dollars), while India's Bombay High
offshore field is estimated at $3125 in 1975 dollars.
Yet the costs of developing additional capacity from all of these
fields (with the exception of Bombay high) are far less than those for the
North Sea. Here we place the range of coefficients, for the British sector
onlyat from $2,000 to $10,000 per initial daily barrel in current dollars.
These costs are based on company estimates made public, and are constantly
subject to revision.
Discounted capital costs per barrel. Perhaps the more appropriate
assessment of costs among fields and between areas is one based on the
cost of production over the life of the field, rather than a strict ranking
of cost coefficients as of the current point in time. Announcements of
secondary recovery programs with the anticipated costs and levels of
maintained productionare particularly helpful in this regard. Not only
are substantial expenditures being made in Iran on this account, but as
well in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Saudi Arabia (the Ghawar field in particular).
Most fields in the British North Sea are expected to commence production
with pressure maintenance. If we assume a stabilized proudction lev.1 for
a twenty-year period, such that there is no decline during that time, take
a discount rate of 20 percent per year as an example, and a decline rate
in the absence of such programs based on the recent average production-to-
reserves ratio of the particular field or area, we may calculate the
discounted capital cost per barrel of the secondary recovery program. In
effect, we are trying to establish the cost of the production represented
by the shaded area below, where curve I represents the stabilized production
level and curve Ii represents the production path over time without
expenditures for pressure and capacity maintenance.
-4 -
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More specifically, we may state those future barrels to be recovered in
present barrel equivalents, where the PBE, in billions of barrels, is:
-rt (a + r)
PBE = q 365[(1 e - e (a+ r)t] (3-2)
The decline rate, a, is to be offset by the expenditures for capacity
maintenance; thus we calculate discounted per-barrel costs as expenditures
divided by the PBE. For Iran, we place these costs at about $0.17 per
barrel, in offshore Abu Dhabi at from $0.91 to $0.99, and at Ghawar in
Saudi Arabia at $0.48.1 In contrast, we estimate discounted capital costs
per barrel in the U.K. North Sea fields to be far higher--from $2.64 to $2.98
in the Forties field, $1.09 to $3.59 in Ninian (this field's potential has
It is surprising to find the Ghawar cost to be higher than that
estimated for onshore Iranian fields. We suspect this may be an artifact
of the particular ranges over which these igures are estimated. The
Ghawar costs are for an expansion from the current 5 million barrels per
day to as high as 8 million, whereas the iranian costs are for a range
close to the current output of 5 to 6 million barrels per day. There are
indications that Iranian costs rise many many fold at an output not much
above the current level.
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recently been revised downward substantially), and at just under $5.00 per
barrel in Brent. In all these calculations the choices of the discount
factor and the anticipated decline rate for not-yet producing fields
are critical.
Current variable costs of production. We should for all producing
areas like to have an accurate reading of current production costs per
barrel. Our efforts have been slowed here because of the peculiarity of
reporting in the trade press, where "costs" on a per-barrel basis appear
to be simply total expenditures, both capital and operating, divided by
current production. This method gives a cost of 25¢ per barrel in Saudi
Arabia, yet nly 19C in Iran. Such a ratio seems to contradict all that
is L:nown about these two areas.
Our own view is that current variable producing costs in Saudi Arabia
are about 8 per barrel, about the same in Kuwait, and about 12¢ per barrel
in Iran. Clearly, we have not been able to reconcile the wide range of
production costs in Saudi Arabia. At the other end of the scale, current
estimates of operating costs of some U.K. North Se.a fields are expected to
be no less than $2 to $3 per barrel. But our estimates are very weak for
all areas.
Statistical Studies of Costs. While we have many estimates of capital
coefficients of varying quality for a number of areas and fields, there are
other producing areas for which we have none. In order to fill this gap,
we have tried to estimate capital expenditures econometrically in various
parts of the world. The minimum objective of this approach was to validate
the reliability of allocating rigtime expenditures within each region in
the Chase Manhattan capital expenditures series li]. The independent
variables used were onshore and offshore rigtime, plus capacity added per
well to capture differential surface capital expenditures.
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Worldwide, most of the variation in expenditures was explained. In
some of the half-dozen principal regions of the world, the variation in
expenditures was satisfactorily explained by the rigtime method; in others,
it was not. But the coefficients serving to estimate expenditures directly
from rigtinme data ithout the need to allocate regional expenditures figures
were not sufficiently stable and their standard errors were unacceptably
large. The possible causes for the mixed results include (a) only 13 data
points for each region, (b) measurements errors in the rigtime data,
(c) year-to-year lumpiness in investment, and (d) multicollinearity between
onshore and offshore rigtimes..
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4. STUDY OF ARKET-CLEARING PROCESSES
If this were a competitive market, then it would be a straishtforaard
matter to take the results of the deman(nd studies and the analysis of price-
taker supply, add some iformation on transport and refining cost, and con-
struct a model of market tfehavior with these components alone. In a com-
petitive world, all suppiicrs aire price takers, and a supply-demand equili-
brium can be calculated uSinqg well-established principles. The market will
equilibrate in such a way as to maximize the sum of consumers' and producers'
surpllus--the ultimate result depending on the demand elasticities of the
importers, the supply functions of the exporters and the costs of transport
and refining. The "mnarket clearing process"--that is, the process by which
it is determined who sells what to whom, and at what price--is precisely the
higgling and bargaining in the market: the "invisible hand" of the classical
economists.
The current orld oil market is far different. First, the over.:l price
level in the world oil market is now set by the coordinated actions of members
of the OPEC cartel. This price level is stated in terms of a "marker crude,"
usually the F.O.B. price for Saudi Aabian light crude oil. Under our "two-
model" approach outlined in Section 1, the analysis of likely cartel behavior
in setting this price level is carried out in models separate from the general
simulation framework. Our progress in developing and testing these cartel
behavior models is covered in Section 4.1 below.
Of course, the focus of this study is not only on the price strategy of
the cartel, but on the ability of the cartel to sustain any given strategy
under the latent competitive pressures to which any price-fixing arrangement
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is subject. (A major purpose of the simulation framework, as pointed out in
Section 1, is to provide a "numerical laboratory" for testing the consistency
of various hypotheses about market structure and cartel price policy.) The
capacity of a cartel to sustain a price far above the competitive level de-
pends on its ability to control supply (and the price shaving that may be
needed to sell additional supplies) from within its own ranks. And this pro-
blem of internal discipline is intimately tied up with the issue of transport
costs, quality differentials and the associated price structure in the
market, given any price level.
This is true because the cartel does not have any formal mechanism for
allocating production among its members. The production in any area is a
function of a number of elements including (1) the production policy o the
government, (2) the crude oil needs of the integrated international oil com-
panies, considering the demand in the particular countries they serve, and
(3) the relative price of oil at one source as opposed to another. As trans-
port rates and quality premia fluctuate, producer countries try, each on his
own, to adjust their prices so as to avoid large swings in ,utput from one
country to another,l and yet at the same time avoid the progressive price
shaving that can occur under a process of constant adjustment of the structure
of prices.
Thus the study of the transport market, and of quality differentials and
associated refinery costs, play two roles in the overall analysis. They are
required to establish the linkages in the overall simulation model, as shown
in Ficure 1. They also are important to the analysis of the way short-run
swings in transport costs and quality premia can put pressure on the cartei
lThe recent OPEC conference shows hogs sensitive the members were to
these fluctuations.
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price itself. Progress in analysis of this part of the system is described
in Section 4.2 below.
Finally, international transfers of oil have to be paid for, and this
raises the issues of the financial aspects of this market. Financial factors
come into play in two ways. First, the character of the financial instru-
ments available have an influence on the value of oil production to an ex-
porter with revenues in excess of current import needs, and this may have
some influence on the desired rate of output. And second, these financial
flows must be "cleared" through international markets for financial assets
and goods, and the problems of this adjustment process are part of the eval-
uation of the implications of any given market scenario, as shown in Figure
1. Our activity in this area is covered in Figure 4.3.
4.1 Behavioral Models of OPEC Pricing
In a cartel-dominated market, one of the more difficult tasks for the
cartel members is to come to agreement on the price level for the commodity
they control. Of course, if the cartel has sufficient internal disci:'line,
and efficient ways to redistribute funds among the members, it would clearly
be to the group's advantage to behave like a monopolist. That is, they
should coordinate their production plans as if they were a multi-plant firm,
charge the price that maximized the present value of group revenue over time,
and distribute the proceeds among the members in a way that kept everybody
happy. Indeed, approximations of such a monopoly solution give considerable
insight into likely cartel behavior, and we have conducted several experi-
ments with this type of model, as reported below.
Unfortunately for the analyst, however, this is not the whole story.
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The cartel members are not a homogeneous group, and their interests (politi-
cal as well as economic) do not necessarily coincide. Neither do they have
a mechanism for joint production planning or for financial compensation of
members who may be disadvantaged by one or another group pricing policy.
In fact, at times it may be difficult for the cartel leaders to determine
who is in the cartel and who is out. As noted earlier, several members of
OPEC appear to behave as "price takers," and thus are outside the cartel so
far as group discipline is concerned. Others in the core of the cartel it-
self still may have conflicting interests, and may form into shifting co-
alitions within the larger group in an attempt to achieve their individual
objectives.
The complexity of the process that ultimately determines price is evi-
dent from a casual reading of the news reports of OPEC meetings. It is not
surprising that the theoretical work on oligopoly behavior has failed to
produce the straightforward analytical results that are possible with com-
petitive markets or pure monopoly.l
In this circumstance, we ,.ave pursued several parallel approaches in an
attempt to develop methods of analysis of cartel behavior that shed light on
this particular case. Two efforts, one by Pindyck and another by LWeitzman
and Cemer, involve formal dynamic optimizing models either of a monopoly
A review of 5! cartel agreements in 18 international commodity in-
dustries [2] does reveal a history that is consistent with available
theoretical literature. The more efficient cartels occurred in circum-
stances where concentration of production was high, the cartel's market
share as high, here the membershi o had cost advantaaes over outsiders,
and where demands were inelastic. However, even in these favorable cir-
cu.st ances the averace life w as only four to six vears, thouc when a cartel
collapsed Ithere usually was an effort (often successful) to reestablish it.
Moreover, the history indicates that cartels fare worse hen governments
are involved.
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case, or simple two-coalition situations. Another by Eckbo [3] looks at de-
sired price patterns for various configurations of the cartel, considering
the allocation problems within the group. The Eckbo model was intended both
as an exploration of ways to model cartel price policy and as a first-stage
experiment in the process of preparing the simulation framework discussed in
Section 1. The Eckbo model is based on an extension of the theory of static
monopoly behavior, and is desiqned to allow calculation of the implications
of various production quota systems as well as pricing strategies within the
cartel.
4.1.1 Dynamic Optimizinq Models
In the search for analytical models that can capture the dynamics of the
cartel's pricing problem, two approaches are being explored. 1 The flavor of
the work can be seen in an optimal control model that shows great promise for
yielding insight in this area. The first version of this analysis is a mono-
poly model and assumes that the cartel sets the price of crude oil over time
(providing only as much as can be sold at that price) so a to maxim' e the
sum of discounted profits. (Currently this model does not take account of
how cartel members will reconcile differences in objectives, or how prices
can be determined to maximize cartel stability given these differences.) 2
1The example shown here uses the Pindyck model. Weitzman and Cremer
have tried a full dynamic optimizing approach that has many of the character-
istics of the optimal control approach described in the text, but uses a
different formulation of the cost of supply and a different view of importer
price expectations. The Weitzman-Cremer model will be reported in a forth-
coming discussion paper.
2The optimal pricing patterns for the simple monopoly case may also pro-
vide some information about the ability of the cartel to hold tocether in the
long run. If the optimal pattern calls for fluctuations in price with per-
iods in hich output (and revenues) are very low, some cartel members micht
find this hard to accept. On the other hand, a pricing (output) policy that
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What makes this problem interesting is that supply from the price-taker
suppliers is not inelastic in the long run, and has a dyramic dependence on
prices (through the process of exploration and discovery of reserves, as well
as the development of alternative energy sources). If the cartel sets too
high a price, competitive supply will increase as a result of offshore
drilling, etc. Thus the cartel must discourage excessive "entry," and is
faced with a dynamic limit pricing problem, in which price cannot be set too
high, or cannot be maintained at a high level for too long. In setting price,
the cartel must consider the dynamics of exploration, discovery, and pro-
duction of oil (and oil substitutes) by the price-taker fringe.
Our initial formulation of the problem is quite simple. The model
describes the total demand for oil as a function of current and past prices,
and supply of oil from price-taker suppliers as another function of current
and past prices; the demand for cartel oil is simply the difference between
total demand and price-taker supply. We assume that the OPEC countries have,
in the aggregate, a fixed reserve base, and that as the reserve base is de-
pleted the marginal cost of production rises, becoming infinite as reserves
approach zero. We can thus solve a classical optimal control problem,
maximizing the sum of discounted profits subject to the constraints of the
behaviorial model.
The basic model is specified to account for differences between short-
run and long-run price elasticities both in demand and in competitive supply.
Parameters in the model were chosen to be "reasonable," i.e., to be roughly
satisfies the neds of all of the cartel members mny be very far from the
optimal monopoly price. Sim ilarly, unless output rationa ization (or side
payments) can be effeced easily, an optimal onopoly behavior may result
in unacceptably low revenues to some members, thus encouraging cheating.
consistent with elasticity estimates in the OECD study [8], and with crude
elasticity estimates that we obtained from aggregate time-series data. The
equations of one simple version of the model are as follows:
TDt = 3.5 - .15Pt_ + .87TDtl
Dt = TD t - St (2)
St = 1.5 + O1Pt + .75St_- (3)
Rt = Rt-l - Dt (4)
Max W = N ) t [P - m/Rt]Dt (5)
t=l (l+6)t t t t
where TDt = total demand for oil (billions of barrels per year)
Dt = demand for cartel oil billions of barrels per year)
St = supply of competitive fringe (billions of barrels per year)
mo/Rt = average production cost for cartel ($/barrel)
Rt = reserves of cartel (billions of barrels)
The demand equation (1) is based on a total demand of 18 billion barrels
per year at an equilibrium price of $6 per barrel, and gives an average short-
run elasticity of .05 and a long-run elasticity of .4, with a Koyck adjustment.
This is actually reasonably elastic; the elasticities are 0.1 and 0.8 at a
price of $12 and demand of 18 billion barrels.l
Note that there is no autonomous growth in demand, e.g., in response
to GNP growth or population growth. We are interested here only in price
effects. This means, however, that our results for the optimal price will
be on the low side, since it is reasonable to expect at least 3 annual
growth in demand if there were no change in price.
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The price-taker supply equation (3) has, at a $6 price, an average
short-run elasticity of .1 and a long-run elasticity of .4, again with a
Koyck adjustment. At an equilibrium price of $6, competitive supply is
about 6.5 billion barrels per year.
Note that the average cost of production for the cartel increases
hyperbolically as Rt goes to zero. In performing the optimization, e take
the initial (1975) reserve level to be 500 billion barrels. In addition,
we set m at 250, so that initial average cost is 50d per barrel.
In performing the optimizations, we initialized the problem by setting
the OPEC price at $11.50 in 1975 (close to its actual price), and calculate
an optimal set of prices over the next forty years, in constant 1975 prices.
We have experimented with this model for a number of alternative
elasticity assumptions, and Figure 4, which is based on the data specified
above, shows a typical result at real discount rates of 5 and 10 percent.
The results call for an increase in price to $13-14 in 1976, and then
a drop to about $8 in 1980, and a slow rise in price thereafter. The reason
for the hioher prices in the first few years is that OPEC can take advantage
of the difference in short-run and long-run elasticities. It will take 3 or
4 years for demand to drop and price-taker supply to increase in response
to a high OPEC price, so that it is optimal for the cartel to set a high price
and capture large profits in the first few years.
Note that the higher discount rate (.10 vs. .05) results in a higher
price and lower rate of depletion of OPEC reserves. The higher price results
in less production but higher cartel profits in the first five years (as
well as lower profits in later years) since short--un elasticities are small.
Thus reserve depletion is not a significant problem for the cartel operating
Figure 4. Cartel Pricina Experiment
$/bbl
1.4 0
193c I 995
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as a monopolist. In this model, as aggregate reserves drop from 500 billion
barrels to 250, production cost doubles (to $1 per barrel), reducing profits
only by 50¢ per barrel. (It will be interesting to examine a model in which
production costs rise more rapidly as reserves are depleted.)
Clearly our initial results are limited by the simplicity and inaccuracies
of the model. Later we will experiment with larger and hopefully more real-
istic models that, among other things, take into account the process of ex-
ploration, discovery, and potential reserve depletion on the part of the com-
petitive fringe. In addition, work is underway on a version of this model
that views OPEC as a two-member cartel rather than as a monopolist.
4.1.2 "Story-telling" Exercises
The framework developed by Eckbo [3] also has been used to develop and
test a number of scenarios or "story-telling" exercises about cartel price
policy. For example, in one such exercise, OPEC was subdivided into three
sub-groups:
- The "hard core" of the cartel, which was assumed to consic.t of
the countries that have the largest recoverable reserves of oil,
produce at the lowest rate of depletion, have the highest level
of excess capacity, have the highest financial surplus level,
and have demonstrated an ability to work together within a
colluding areement. Tncluded in this group were Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, U.A.E. and Catar, and Libya.
- The "price pushers"--a group that consists of the countries that
produce at the highest level of depletion, have the lowest level
of excess capacity, and have a strong need for current income.
Iran, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Algeria were included in this
category.
- The "expansionist frince," %which consists of the countries that
produce at an intermediate rate of depl-eti-,n, expanded production
at a rapid rate in 1 73/74, have a hich need for current income,
and do not have their major export terminais in the Persian Gulf.
Indonesia, Iraq, Gabon, and Nigeria were placed in this group.
A-54-
Given this breakdown, a number of simulations can be made, testing
various hypotheses about which group dominates in price-setting discussions
and how production is allocated among group members. As an example of this
type of exercise, Table 2 shows a scenario similar to that prepared by the
OECD [81 where the price is assumed to remain at 9.00 per barrel in 1972
dollars over the period to 1984. Some rough estimates of import requirements
(based on a survey of estimates by others) are included in this calculation,
and it is assumed that 1974 market shares prevail over the period. A real
rate of return of 5 percent is assumed for OPEC investments abroad.
It can be seen from the first set of columns that under these assump-
tions income from oil exports and the earnings of financial assets abroad
will fall short of the import requirements of the "expansionist fringe" by
1978 and of the "price pushers" in 1980. The level of excess capacity in the
"expansionist fringe" might be as high as 5.5 million barrels per day in
1978, and one would expect these conditions to place severe strain on cartel
discipline.
Based on these calculations, one then is led to experiment with dif-
ferent pricing strategies and quota systems to see which patterns are in-
ternally consistent and plausible, and which appear unlikely based on ana-
lysis of their implications for participating members of the cartel.
These simulations from models of cartel behavior then provide the
pricing assumptions for the larger and more detailed simulation described
in Section 1.
43
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4.2 Transportation and Refin ng
These models of the level of OPEC prices must be supplemented with
analysis of' the role of transportation and refining in determining the
overall structure of prices. There are several reasons why the transport
market must be considered. First, because of the distances involved and
the heavy investment required for tankers, loading, unloading, and storage
facilities, and the cost of fuel oil and insurance coverage, the cost of
transporting oil is not insignificant relative to the cost of crude oil
itself. (In the past, because of the "low" price of oil in percentage
terms the transportation cost was more significant than it is now, but in
absolute termis it is now larger.) Unless we understand how transportation
costs affect oil prices we will not be able to predict the latter.
The markets for transportation capacity are highly competitive, and
because of the low elasticity of short-run demand, wide fluctuations in
rates are observed. In order- to understand oil pricing, we must be able
to determine who absorbs what part of these fluctuations and what are the
implications of such on the behavior of the producing countries. Oil is
mostly sold on a delivered basis, and therefore the fluctuations in trans-
port costs create pressures on the price structure and price levels for oil,
as noted in Section 1. Whenever the transportation rates are low, distant
producing countries have, other things equal, a comparative advantage over
countries which are closer to the consuming centers, and vice versa. This
requires "instantaneous" adjustments in the F.O.B. prices if delivered
prices are to remain constant at the rmarket place. The fluctuations in
tanker rates, therefore, are not only administratively bothersome, but they
also create fluctuating "net backs" to the varicus producers. Where choice
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exists, these fluctuations will encourage shifts in the liftings from one
country to another, and thus will strain alliances. This is an important
phenomenon which needs to be fully analyzed.
Of course the greater the margin between out-of-pocket costs and
delivered prices, the greater (again other things remaining constant) the
ability of sellers to absorb fluctuations in the cost of transportation
and thus to withstand pressures on the cartel price. The ever-changing
nature of arrangements between the international oil companies and the OPEC
countries creates new possibilities in this realm, however. On the one
hand the trend, in ownership of production facilities (i.e., the move
toward 100% participation) results in smaller margins for the transporter/
refiner, and a reduction in the flexibility of international oil companies
to absorb significant changes in the level and structure of rates. On the
other hand, there is the ambition of producing countries to become major
forces i the area of transportation and even refining. If this means tne
elimination of the international oil companies as intermediaries, then
pressures for the exporting countries to absorb freight differentials may
increase, which in turn will put pressure on "net backs." The significance
of these pressures depends on the relationships among the international oil
companies and the producing countries, and on the degree to which the latter
enter into the area of shipping and refining. It is important, therefore,
to monitor this portion of the market very closely.
Research to date has focused on the determinants of spot transport rates,
so that projections can be made on the current cost of transportation at various
points in time. There are at least four dimensions of the short-run cost of
transportation which re rlevant for our research.
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- Short-Run Cost Structure. We need to know the operating
costs for tankers of different sizes. This will enable
us to develop scale curves for the industry and a
static short-run supply schedule of transportatior
capacity. Based upon a selection of the "relevanrt"
vessels for the various runs (routes), we will
develop a matrix of costs so that we can determine
the landed price of oil under various conditions.
- Level of Soot Rates. We must develop a model for determining
the level of spot rates at various points in time. This
we need as an input to the price vector applicable to
future points in time.
- Structure of Sot Rates. Given the extensive economies of
scaetha-t accrue with the size of tankers it is necessary
to analyze the structure of rates and determine the way
these economies are divided between the owners and the
users of tankers. Depending on the sophistication of
the model the rough approximations of a representative
spot rate may not be satisfactory, and therefore a
structure will be used. WIe expect that once we develop
a model relating cost of operation, level of rates, and
structure of rates, we will have the necessary flexibility
to choose whatever is appropriate for the main model.
- Range of Fluctuations. As we have already stated, structural
differences and fluctuations in rates cause pressure on
the "net back" and on te adjustment mechanisms of the
producing countries. The wider these differentials and
fluctuations around the general price level, the harder
it is to administer the price/output system. In order
to analyze these pressures and adjustment mechanisms,
therefore, we must analyze these fluctuations.
A subsequent step of the research will be concerned with determining
the relationships between the structure of spot rates and the structure of
time charter rates. This will enable us to determine the relevant cost for
transportation in the long-run. Besides the short-run considerations, we
wish to analyze the behavior of time charter rates because on the average
over 80% of all oil transported is carried on vessels owned by oil companies
or chartered by them on a long-term basis. So although the spot rate at
any moment in time is very important in the short-run, its impact diminishes
as one tries to plan for the future.
* 4
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For the determination of "long-term rates" we intend to define a
relevant time duration and develop a structure of time-charter rates (for
vessels of different sizes). Finally, we would like to develop a model
which will enable us to predict what will be the appropriate time charter
rate for vessels of different sizes, Lunder different cost and spot-rate
assumptions for different time durations and at different points in time.
A third stage of the work in this area will involve a review of the
structure of refinery locations, and projection of the consequences of any
changes on the cost of transportation of energy and in turn the price of oil.
4.3 Financing
Financing the flow of oil and the recycling of oil producer revenues
have been recognized as two of the major problems arising from increased
oil prices. In general, both probleims have been viewed from the perspective
of the consuming countries, i.e., how will they finance their oil imports
and how will OPEC investment flows affect their financial markets and
economies. Hiowever, these problems also may play a major role in the
decisions of the producer countries over time.
Financial considerations can be viewed as affecting producers' decisions
in three ways. The most direct effect is on how they decide to allocate their
-ealth (mostly in the form of oil) among the three major alternatives-- oil
in the ground, domestic consumption and real investment, and external
financial assets--in order to establish an optimal time-path of consumption.
Since this requires intertemporal optimization, much light can be shed on the
problem by e, : o ly inc .nvestment decsion moe:s. One clear imlication of
such models is that the atractiveness of extern-i financial claims in terms
of expected appreciation or depreciatio n in purchasing power, and risk. ffects
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the time path of consumption decisions and thus may affect pricing and
output decisions as well.
Given this framework it is possible to derive some conclusions about
the potential effects of the accumulation of financial assets on the pricing
of oil in a cartel situation. It can easily be shown that different
consumption and investment patterns will result from different assumptions
about discount rates--which reflect basic time preferences as well as
different degrees of risk aversion--and these will affect the optimal
price for oil over time as viewed by different members of the cartel.
The third, although indirect, role of financial considerations is
through the mechanism of "recycling." Generally speaking, the term
"recycling" refers to (1) an exchange of oil for a financial asset ("bond")
or (2) trade in "bonds" among importing countries whereby one importing
country accepts the "bonds" of another and pays for th2 oil with its own
"bonds" in order to permit imports by the country unable to finance oil
imports with its own "bonds." The result is a larger flow of oil than
would otherwise take place. In the two cases, referred to as "primary
recycling" and "secondary recycling" the mere existence of financial arkets
as well as the "depth" of the markets in terms of securities' characteristics
are of great importance.
This part of the research places major emphasis on these issues, focusing
on the nature and volume of available financial assets in the world's capital
markets as a potential influence on the pricing and output decisions. To
some extent, the relationship of the financial study to the large simulation
and the optimizing models of cartel behavior is similar to that of the
transport and refining study. The overall simulation results and the optimal
output paths in tilhe cartel models are determined without reference to physical
constraints imposed by transport or to "capacity" constraints in financial
markets. These latter "constraints" can be viewed as resulting both from
non-OPEC behavior, i.e., restrictions on OPEC investment, and from OPEC
behavior, i.e., insistence on investing in only a very narrow range of
assets. The results of the two major modeling efforts then are checked
in a market clearing context to see if they are rendered infeasible by
the constraints.
Considerable progress has been made in preparation for this cross-
checking of the major models with potential financial constraints. Current
OPEC investment patterns, policies toward OPEC investment, and special
proposals for OPEC funds have been surveyed, Projections of OPEC build-ups
have been monitored and summarized (although the major models of the M.I.T.
study are expected to provide better projections). Finally, various measures
of the volume as well as the specific risk-return attributes of available
assets have been studied in some detail.
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5. REVISED WORK SCHEDULE
Table 3 presents a revision of the work plan originally presented in
Supplement No. 2 (dated December 20, 1974) to the research proposal to NSF.
The bulk of the table is essentially the same as that presented earlier,
except all tasks are shifted one month to account for the fact that the
December 20 table anticipated a February start, and the project did not
receive NSF support until March. Other changes from the original work plan
are described in a set of notes to Table 3, with references at the appropriate
points in the table. The table notes also provide an indication of the
progress on tasks that have not changed since the original table was prepared.
Several points that were discussed in the text above are evident in
the revised work plan. Earlier, we had a cateogry of activities called
"special studies;" in this report these tasks fall in the area of study of
"market clearing processes." Progress in these areas is about as expected.
In addition, a set of tasks or financial aspects has been added. Work on
data preparation for supply studies is proceeding about as planned. However,
on the basis of the first six months work, it is possible to write more
clear task statement for the modeling aspect of the supply analysis. This
is included in the table.
As the table shows, the demand work has fallen behind the original
schedule, due to difficulties in data collection. The problems encountered
in this area are discussed in Section 2. The development of the overall
simulation framework is procedin-, satisfactorily, although it appears that
the full integration of the supply and demand analyses into simulation
model will take place two or three months later in the project period then
originally anticipated.
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Finally, the table makes clear that this plan covers only the first
18 months of a longer term effort. At several points in the text, reference
is made to tasks that logically come only after completion of early stages
of the research, or that do not appear feasible within the project resources
(expertise and manpower as well as funds) that are available in the current
grant period. Though the planning of the next major phase of the work
(beyond August 1976) has been carried out in less detail than the first
18 nnths, Table 3 shows the areas we believe will prove important points
of focus for extension and improvement of the analysis.
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NOTES FOR TABLE 3
(1) Task completed and results integrated with other parts of the
research program.
(2) Task completed and discussion paper available.
(3) Task completed and discussion paper in preparation.
(4) Work on task proceeding as anticipated.
(5) Task description remains essentially the same, but timing
revised to that shown by dotted line.
(6) Task redefined; revised text shown here. For original see
see Supplement No. 2 to the research proposal, dated December 20, 1974.
(7) New task, partially supported by M.I.T. Energy Laboratory
Internal Funds.
(8) Continuation of research in this area will be a major focus of
work in any continuation beyond August 1976.
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